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INTRODUCTION

he title of this Symposium is LitigatingZealously Within the
Bounds of the Law. On first hearing, the title conjures up
thoughts of the restrictions substantive law imposes on an
attorney's conduct at trial. This idea was prominent in the proposed final
draft of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which noted that the attorney acts within "a larger legal context."'
More directly, the Model Rules emphasize that even when an attorney acts
in a representative capacity, he or she is not exempt from duties imposed
by substantive law.' The attorney must "conform to the requirements of the
law."3
For example, while an attorney has an ethical duty to his or her client
to represent the client with loyalty4 and vigor, that duty does not excuse
deliberate complicity in the commission of a crime at trial.6 Substantive

1MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
2See id.
3

Id. at 1.

4See
5See

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1998).
id. Rules 1.1, 1.3.
"On the topics of perjury and false statement, it should be noted that attorneys
are bound by Model Rule 3.3. This Rule establishes that an attorney who makes a
misleading statement, or uses others to make misleading statements, in the
representation of a client is acting unethically and is subject to discipline. See id.
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criminal law forbids perjury,7 and an attorney may not knowingly assist in
the presentation ofperjurious testimony.' These substantive law restrictions
on representation produce a highly visible issue of legal ethics.9
In State v. PhilipMorris, Inc., Special Master Mark Gehan addressed
a practical restriction on attorney conduct that emanates from a source
other than substantive law.10 His ruling produced a condign resolution of
the ethical issues before him. The analysis he used, however, gave no
consideration to an issue of evidence law that significantly affects the
safety of products sold in the marketplace.
Master Gehan was asked to decide whether scientific research into the
safety of tobacco products conducted or sponsoredby cigarette manufacturers was discoverable." When the plaintiffs sought discovery of the
research, the defendants resisted on the grounds of the attorney-client and
work product privileges.' 2 The plaintiffs responded by contending that the
privileges did not attach to the research in question 3 and that the crimefraud exception overcame the privileges in any event.4 On the crime-fraud
issue, the plaintiffs urged that long before the litigation commenced,
the defendants' attorneys had sought to misuse the law of evidence by
Rule 3.3.
7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1623 (1994).
'See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.5 (1986).
9The specific limitation on representation imposed by the crime of perjury is
one of the most noted and vexing issues in legal ethics. See, e.g., Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975); Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibilityofthe CriminalDefense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966); Norman
Lefstein, The CriminalDefendant Who ProposesPerjury:Rethinking the Defense
Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFsTRA L. REv. 665 (1978).
'o See Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendations RegardingNon-LiggettPrivilege Claims, Statev. Philip Morris,
Inc., No. CI-94-8565 (Minn. D. Ct 1998) [hereinafter Report of Special Master].
This report was approved and adopted with clarifications by the court in an order
dated March 7, 1998. See State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL
25714 (Minn. D. Ct. Mar. 7, 1998). Additionally, the full text of this report is
available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.stic.neu.edu/MN/
specialmaster2-10-98.html>. Citations in this Article refer to a copy of the report
obtained from the Clerk of Court, Minnesota State District Court, Second Judicial
District, Room 600, 15 West Kelley Boulevard, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55102.
"See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 5.
'2 See id. para. 7.
'3 See id. para. 5.
'4 See id. para. 8.
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"wrap[ping]"' Is the research in spurious "privilege shields."16 For certain
categories of documents, the special master accepted both of the plaintiffs'
arguments. 7 The resulting report in PhilipMorris is an innovative and
significant opinion concerning ethical limitations on attorney conduct
because it focuses on unethical attorney conduct prior to litigation and uses
adjectival evidence law rather than substantive law to sanction such
conduct.
Trial court opinions rarely garner scholarly attention, much less a
report by a special master on discovery issues. However, pretrial discovery
opinions, such as Master Gehan's report, control an extremely important
phase of the litigation process that merits more attention than it usually
receives. Roughly ninety-five percent of all civil cases are resolved without
trial,'8 with the pretrial phase of litigation supplying the culmination of the
dispute formerly expected at trial. 19 In most cases, an attorney's case is
effectively on trial during pretrial discovery,2° which can aptly be described
as "the center of gravity" in litigation.21 As one text on discovery states:
From the outset of the litigation, the attorney must "try" the case and
attempt to prove the case to the other side during pretrial. If the attorney
does not gather enough facts to make out a prima facie case, the opposing
attorney can terminate the suit by a summary judgment motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.... If the attorney gathers barely
enough facts to make out a submissible case, the parties may settle; but
the settlement will undoubtedly be unfavorable to the attorney's client.
However, if the attorney succeeds in impressing the opponent during
discovery, the likely denouement is a favorable settlement... In the
words of one veteran trial attorney, contemporary litigation is one-tenth
trial and nine-tenths discovery. 22
1d. para. 42.
1d. para. 316.
7
' See Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Ethics in Ashes: Big Tobacco's
Lawyers HideBehind the CloakofPrivilege,CAL. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 46; Paul R.
Rice, We Haven't Got a Secret Anymore: How the Tobacco Industry Lost Its
Attorney-ClientPrivilege,LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at 27.

" See Joseph Kelner, Settlement TechniquesPartOne, TRIAL, Feb. 1980, at 39.
'9See Charles Maher, DiscoveryAbuse, CAL. LAW., June 1984, at 46.
20 See Hicks Epton, Effective Use ofPre-TrialDiscovery, 19 ARK. L. REV. 9,
15 (1965).
2 John W. Cooley, PuncturingThree Myths About Litigation,A.B.A. J., Dec.
1984, at 75, 76.
2 THEODORE V. BLUMOFF, MARGARETZ. JOHNS &EDWARD J.IMWINKELRIED,

PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT § 2.1, at
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In recognition of that realistic perspective, we recommend that legal ethics
scholars give greater attention to discovery decisions such as Master
Gehan's report.
The report deals with a topic of great magnitude with a long history:
the legal status of claims for compensation brought against cigarette
manufacturers. As Master Gehan's report points out, the 1950s witnessed
a dramatic increase in the level of regulatory activity affecting the cigarette
industry.?3 The Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration in particular expressed their concern about the health
hazards posed by cigarette smoking.24 That activity spurred legislative
interest in the subject. In 1957, Congress held the "Blatnik hearings,"
investigating the disclosure of tar and nicotine levels in advertising.2" The
combination of administrative activity and congressional hearings brought
the subject to the public's attention. The first of many lawsuits naming the
tobacco manufacturers as defendants was filed in 1954.26
In the PhilipMorris case in which Master Gehan submitted his report,
the plaintiffs were the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Minnesota. They sued to recover the costs incurred in providing medical
care to persons afflicted by illnesses caused by cigarette smoking.27 The
roster of defendants in PhilipMorriswas a veritable "Who's Who" of the
tobacco industry: Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson,
British-American Tobacco Company Limited, Lorillard, the American
Tobacco Company, and Liggett Group, as well as an entity which figured
prominently in Master Gehan's report, the Council for Tobacco Research.
During the pretrial discovery phase of Philip Morris, the plaintiffs
requestedproduction ofa large volume of documents, including documents
reflecting scientific research into the health hazards posed by cigarette
smoking. 8 The defendants objected to production of the research and
communications regarding it on the basis ofthe workproduct and attorneyclient privileges, respectively.2 9 These objections were the catalyst for
Master Gehan's report.

12 (1993) (citations omitted).
I See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para: 2.
24
See id.
I See id.para.4.
1 See id. para. 1.
27 See id.
ISee id.para.5.
29 See id. paras. 5-6.
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In his report, Master Gehan relied primarily on traditional attorneyclient privilege analysis to dispose of the defendants' objections. 3 He
initially addressed the question of whether there was a prima facie case for
the application of either privilege. Noting that attorney-client communications are privileged onlywhen the predominant purpose ofthe communication is "legal in nature," 1 Master Gehan found that the research in question
had not been generated primarily for a legal purpose. 32 The industry had
made public representations that it would conduct and publicize research
into the alleged health hazards posed by smoking.33 Either by operation of
tort law or by virtue of their voluntary undertaking,34 the defendants had
"an independent obligation to conduct research into the safety of [their]
product, and to warn the product's consumers if the research results
supported negative conclusions."3' 5 Since that independent obligation was
sufficient to motivate the research, the prima facie claim for privilege was
deficient.
As an alternative basis for his decision,36 Master Gehan invoked the
crime-fraud exceptionto the attorney-client37 andworkproduct38 privileges.
He construed the exception broadly. Minnesota law does not require the
party seeking discovery to establish all the elements of common law

30 We realize that he did so largely because the litigants chose to argue the issue
in those terms.
1,Report of Special Master, supranote 10, parm. 318.
32
See id.paras. 328-29.
33 See id.para. 32.
See id. paras. 294, 299.
3 5 Id.para. 329.
36The crime-fraud exception analysis served as an alternative basis for ordering
the production of the documents reflecting the scientific research. It also functioned
as a basis for ordering the disclosure of attorney-client communications related to
the research.
37 It is well-settled that there is a crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client
privilege. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2298, at 572 (McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
18 There is a split of authority over the question of whether there is a crimefraud exception to work product protection. See Teresia B. Jovanovic, Annotation,
FraudException to WorkProductPrivilegein FederalCourts,64 A.L.R. FED. 470
(1983). However, there is respectable authority recognizing the exception. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 752 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 615 F. Supp. 958, 965 (D. Mass. 1985).

1998-991

MINNESOTA V PHILIPMORRIS, INC.

1133

fraud. 9 Cautioning against applying the exception in a "rigid" fashion,40
Master Gehan held that the plaintiffs had established that the exception
applied to many of the documents subject to the production request.4' As
Section I of this Article details, the defendants had created a committee of
attorneys to monitor the scientific research.42 The defendants established
a distribution system in which the research was channeled through the
committee.43 In Master Gehan's mind, the essential purpose of this system
was to create the misleading appearance that all the research was legally
inspired and therefore privileged. 44 The system was an essential part of the
defendants' scheme for selective disclosure of the research results.45 The
defendants had given ongoing assurance to the public" that they would
conduct and release all relevant research.' 7 However, the defendants had
planned throughout to release only those results which supported their
position that cigarette smoking is safe and to suppress any results suggesting that cigarettes are a dangerous product.48 In a broad sense, this scheme
was fraudulent4 9 and triggered the crime-fraud exception to the attorneyclient and work product privileges. In the words of one commentator:
The fraud was the ploy of having potentially damaging studies and
scientific experiments conducted through legal counsel, so they could be
suppressed if they ultimately proved unfavorable to the companies'
interests-even though the companies were representing to the public that
their product was safe and that all such studies and experiments were
being conducted by impartial scientists and fully disclosed, regardless of
50
outcome.
On several scores, we applaud Master Gehan's report. The report sends
a strong message to the bar that even before litigation commences,

19 See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 293 (citing Levin v.
C.O.M.B.
Co., 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
40
Id.

See id.para. 304.
id.para. 40.
See id.para. 112.
"See id.paras. 42, 316.
"45 See id.para. 284.
" See id.para. 302.
41 See id.paras. 16, 32.
48 See id. para. 304.
49
See id. para. 306.
50Rice, supra
note 17, at 28.
41

42
See
43
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attorneys must be conscious of the limitations prescribed by adjectival law
such as privilege concepts in the law of evidence. We also believe Master
Gehan reached the right result in ordering disclosure of the scientific
research. However, the thesis of this article is that the report erred"' in
evaluating the discoverability of the research solely in terms of the
traditional attorney-client and work product privileges. These concepts and
the crime-fraud exception to the privileges were not designed for fact
situations like that presented in Philip Morris, which facially involved
long-term scientific research on complicated product safety issues.
Although Master Gehan was right to order discovery, reliance on these
concepts in future cases involving such research would produce results
contrary to vital public policies favoring product safety research.
To develop this thesis, the Article proceeds in four sections. The first
sets out the factual background of the Philip Morris case. 52 The second
section describes Master Gehan's reasoned application of the attorneyclient and work product privileges and the crime-fraud exception to those
privileges.53 The third section considers the dangers of applying traditional
attorney-client privilege concepts to determine the discoverability of longterm scientific product safety research. 4 Finally, the fourth section
proposes an alternative approach to such cases."5 The essence of that
approach is the application of two non-traditional legal concepts: the
privilege for "self-critical analysis" 6 and the exception to privileges when
the privilege holder puts the privileged material "in issue"5" by making a
misleading partial disclosure of the contents of the otherwise privileged
material.5 1 It is arguable that application of the self-critical analysis
exception might have led Master Gehan to hold that the defendants had
made a prima facie case for the privilege. However, the application of the

s' Again, although Master Gehan authored the report, he was analyzing the
issues
as framed by the litigants.
52See infra notes 59-103.
53See infra notes 104-36.
s4 See infra notes 137-56.
See infra notes 157-245.
56 Phillip Leahy, The Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis in Statutory and
Common Law, 7 DICK. . ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49,49 (1998).
" Terreborme, Ltd. of Cal. v. Murray, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (E.D. Cal.
1998); see Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 161 (Ct.
App. 1994).
"8See United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (8th Cir. 1998)
(stating that a party's privilege "cannot be used as both a shield and a sword").
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in issue exception would have defeated the privilege and supported a
decision permitting discovery of the research.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
OF THE PHILIPMORRIS LITIGATION

As Master Gehan's report indicates, the battle over tobacco took its
modem form in the early 1950s.11 From the beginning, it was clear to the
industry that it had to fight in several venues simultaneously-administrative proceedings, legislative hearings, judicial cases, and the public
forum. ° To fight these battles, the industry developed both a public and
private strategy.
The public strategy opened with the keynote event of the industry's
public relations campaign, the widespread publication of A Frank
Statement to Cigarette Smokers on January 4, 1954.61 The statement
announced the organization of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee,
predecessor to the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR"). 62 Challenging "the 'theory that cigarette smoking is in some way linked with lung
cancer...,' "63 the statement pledged that in order to get at the truth, the
CTR would fund a scientific "research effort into all phases of tobacco use
and health."64 A similar statement released later acknowledged that "the
American public deserve objective scientific answers" to the questions
about the alleged connection between smoking and health problems. 65
Through the CTR, the industry promised the public that it would "conduct
and disclose objective research."6 In the ensuing years, the industry
avowed that it "would not knowingly distribute a dangerous product '67 and
frequently reiterated its ongoing assurance that it was conducting tests and
would reveal the results of pertinent scientific research.6 8
Meanwhile, the private strategy of the industry was severely at odds
with its public representations. Since the industry anticipated litigation, it
59 See

Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para. 2.

60 See id.

61
See id. para. 10.
62 See id. paras. 15-16.
63

Id. para. 15 (quoting Hearings before Judge Fitzpatrick, Apr. 8, 15, 1997).
MId. para.16.
65Id. para. 17.
6Id. para. 22.
617
Id. paras. 173,302.
61 See id. paras. 16, 32.
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strove to ensure that the only scientific evidence available in the litigation
would be research supporting the industry position. To that end, the
industry employed several tactics to discourage and suppress negative
research findings.
One tactic was for the tobacco companies, usually acting through the
CTR as their agent, to control all research in order to minimize the
possibility of generating unfavorable findings.69 This meant that no tobacco
firm should conduct research on its own. Thus, according to Master Gehan,
the leading cigarette manufacturers entered into "a 'gentlemen's agreement' prohibiting [internal] biological research" related to health hazards. 70
At one point, after Philip Morris received information that Reynolds was
violating the agreement, the president of Philip Morris complained to
Reynolds and requested that it shut down its biological research section.7'
The Reynolds section, known as "the Mouse House,"'72 had already
completed preliminary rodent smoke inhalation tests suggesting that
smoking caused emphysema. 73 On short notice, the section was closed and
all twenty-six scientists fired.74 Master Gehan inferred that the section was
'
closed pursuant to the "gentlemen's agreement."75
There was also
deposition testimony that, at one point, industry attorneys told an outside
researcher conducting a study funded by the CTR that his research was
"getting too close to some things. 76
69See id. para.

130.
I1d. para. 132. Any agreement of this type would undoubtedly violate section
1 of the Sherman Act as a "contract, combination... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade." Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Removing health hazards from a
product is the most basic type of product improvement, and product quality is akey
component of competition. The "gentlemen's agreement" between competitors
eliminated this vital aspect of competition, apparently for the reason that such
competitive research was inapposite for this market. Agreements limiting
competition because agreeing competitors consider competition inappropriate
always constitute unreasonable restraints on trade following the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in NationalSociety ofProfessionalEngineersv. UnitedStates,435
U.S. 679, 694-95 (1978). Also, see FTC v. IndianaFederationofDentists, 476
U.S. 447,462-64 (1986), andNCAA v. Regents ofUniversity ofOkla., 468 U.S. 85,
96-97 (1984).
71 See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 122.
7

72 Id. para.

114.

SSee id. para. 115.

74 Seeid. para.
119.
75Id. para. 132.
76

Id. para. 155.
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A second tactic was to ensure that the CTR never came into formal
custody or possession of negative scientific research which might be
damaging if revealed outside the industry. Therefore, a decision was made
to farm several research projects out to European laboratories.' In1970,
Philip Morris purchased INBIFO, a German research facility." Philip
Morris went to some length to ensure that there was no written contract
setting out its agreement with INBIFO.7 9 Even more to the point, while
INBIFO was to submit written reports to Philip Morris, the latter made it
a practice not to retain copies of the reports in its files. 80 Philip Morris
returned all the documents to INBIFO.81 Master Gehan wrote:
These unusual arrangements for handling scientific research at INBIFO
have had an effect in thwarting the discovery proceedings in this case.
[The judge assigned to the case] concluded that Philip Morris's failure to
search the files of... INBIFO... in this action was "an egregious
82
attempt to hide information relevant to this action."
The third tactic was of the greatest interest to Master Gehan. When
documents such as studies of the impact of varying nicotine levels83 were
generated and came into the defendants' custody, they were to be channeled through the defendants' attorneys.8 4 A supervisory Committee of
Counsel was created. 85 By funneling the studies through counsel, 86 the hope
was that the defendants would create87 "privilege shields" 88 for unfavorable
studies. If, at the time of a production request, the research study was
sitting "'in an attorney's files,"',9 the legal privileges would enable the

"See
id. paras. 136-38.
78

See id. para. 137.
7See id. para. 139.
See id. para. 142.
81 See id.
8
2Id. para. 143 (quoting Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Regarding 83
Philip Morris International, March 25, 1997, at 9 (CLAD #826)).
See id. paras. 262-67.
84 See id. para. 145.
85 See id. paras. 40, 151,336.
16 See Rice, supranote 17, at 27.
87 See Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para.42.
8 d.para.316.
89 Zitrin & Langford, supra note 17, at 46 (quoting Memorandum from the
Washington, D.C., law firm of Arnold & Porter to the Committee of Counsel
(1986)).
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defendants to suppress the study." The distribution system was intended to
create the appearance that the documents reflecting the research were
attorney-client communications.9 These procedures followed the spirit of
practitioner-oriented texts and articles that encourage counsel to create a
paper record to support an eventual claim based on one of the legal
privileges.92 These authorities also recommend such steps as framing all
possibly privileged communication as letters to counsel,9 giving such
documents a legal title,94 and keeping them physically separate from
unprivileged material.95
The tension between the industry's public and private strategies is
evident. The industry repeatedly' represented to the public that it was
conducting and disclosing objective scientific research to evaluate the
hypothesis that cigarette smoking caused health problems.97 Meanwhile, it
did not disclose negative research findings, avoided conducting research
into potentially embarrassing subjects, 98 and channeled research through
counsel to support claims oflegalprivilege. 9 If the industry could shelter"°
unfavorable studies by seemingly wrapping them in legal privileges,' 0' it
would have the best of both worlds-it could reveal the scientific research
supporting its position0 2 while claiming legal privileges to suppress
unfavorable studies. 03
II. MASTER GEHAN'S EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON THE TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTS OF THE WORK PRODUCT AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGES AND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION IN HIS REPORT

Against the backdrop of the facts reviewed above, the Master decided
the questions of whether the defendants had established a prima facie case
9o See Rice, supra note 17, at 27.
91 See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 112.
92 See, e.g., James E. Daniels, ManagingLitigation Experts, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1984, at 64, 65.
93 See WALTER BARTHOLD, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE DIsCOvERY

190 (1975).
9 See Cathie A. Shattuck, Use Written Discovery More Effectively, PRAC.

TECHNIQUES

LITIGATOR, May 1990, at 11, 14.
95 See Daniels, supranote 92, at 66.
96 See Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para. 297.

See id.paras. 17, 32, 56-58.
98See

id. paras. 104, 119, 161.

9 See id. para. 112; Rice, supra note 17, at 28.
See Rice, supranote 17, at 28.
'o' See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 42.
'o

See id. para. 291.

103 See id.: Rice. sunra note 17- at 2R: Zitrin & Tana'forc.sunra note- 17. at 46.
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for a privilege and, if so, whether the plaintiffs had established the
applicability of an exception to the privilege.
A. The Master'sReliance on the TraditionalWorkProductandAttorneyClient Privilegesto Assess the Defendant'sPrimaFacie Case
Master Gehan initially took up the question of whether there existed a
prima facie case for the application of the privileges asserted by the
defendants."°4 He implicitly concentrated on the application of the work
product privilege to the scientific research." 5 The work product or any
other privilege applies only to evidence of an activity undertaken for the
purpose the privilege was adopted to promote."° This "purpose" requirement is a corollary of the dominant instrumental rationale for privileges
developed by Dean Wigmore 7 The first priority in the law of evidence
being to promote the discovery oftruth, a privilege should apply only when
the activity in question would not have occurred but for the existence of the
privilege." 8 To apply the purpose requirement, thejudge must focus on the
state of mind of the party creating the document or other material or
making the communication to which the privilege may apply."° Specifically regarding the work product privilege, the protection applies only if
the attorney or the attorney's agent generated the document for litigation
purposes.1 0 Additionally, the requisite purpose need only be the primary
See Report of Special Master, supranote 10, paras. 275-76.
1oSee id.para. 279. The report does not distinguish between the two privileges
in reviewing the basic principles of privilege law. However, the conclusions based
upon that review, while directly applicable to the claim of work product privilege
for the research apply only tangentially to the claim of attorney-client privilege. See
id.
"0With most privileges, the activity protected by the privilege is communication between, e.g., a client and attorney or patient and doctor. The work product
privilege, on the other hand, applies to the activity of an attorney in preparing for
trial. Frequently, such work product is recorded in notes made by the attorney, but
it is not necessarily communicated to anyone.
107 See ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE
"o4

5

LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS §§ 8.01,8.06, at384, 392-94

(1998); 8 WIGMORE, supranote 37, § 2285.
08
' See JACKB. WEINSTEIN &MARGARETA. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 504.03[4][a], at 504-10-11 (JosephM. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
109 See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5490, at 444 (1986).
"°SeeHickmanv. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,510 (1947); 2BERNARD S.JEFFERSON,
JEFFERSON'S CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 41.1 (3d ed. 1997).
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or predominant reason for the activity"' and not the sole or exclusive
motivation. However, if this purpose is merely secondary, the document
would have been developed without the assurance of confidentiality
furnished by a privilege. In such a case, it would not serve the instrumental
rationale to recognize a privilege.
In his report, Master Gehan noted the traditional purpose requirement,
stating that the privilege should attach only if the protected purpose
"predominate[d]." ' He applied this test to the research in question and
found that purposes independent of litigation preparation were the
predominant causes for the research." 3 In support of this finding, he
pointed out that under principles of tort law, the defendants "had an
independent obligation to conduct research into the safety oftheirproducts,
and to warn consumers if the research results supported negative
conclusions."'" 4 Further, if the studies yielded favorable results, the
defendants would put them to public relations uses.' 5 Therefore, since the
predominant purpose for the research was not preparation for litigation, the
6
research was unprivileged.ll
Much of the research had been systematically routed to and through
attorneys for the defendants during the life of the CTR." 7 On the basis of
this fact, the defendants claimed that both the letters of transmittal and the
researchtransmitted were communications protectedbythe attorney-client
privilege. As a corollary of his finding that the predominant purposes ofthe
research were for nonlitigation uses, Master Gehan found that the
communication ofthe researchto the defendants' attorneys was made when
the attorneys were "acting in scientific, administrative or public relations
capacities, but not in a legal capacity.""' Therefore, the purpose of
' See Chadbourne v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10 (Cal. 1964);
Wellpoint Health Networks v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 850 (Ct. App.

1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988); 24 WRIGHT &GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 5490, at
444; Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege:A Study of
theParticipants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191,338 (1989);Note, TheAttorney-Client
Privilegefor In-House Counsel When Negotiating Contracts: A Response to
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roof'mgMfg. Corp., 39 WM. &MARYL.REV. 1397,
1433 (1998).
112 Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para. 277.
3
1 See id. par. 279.
114 Id.
"'6 See id. para. 281.
" See id.
1
'
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
n Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 281.
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transmitting the research to the attorneys was not to obtain legal advice,
which is the
requisite purpose of the attorney-client communications
19
privilege.'
Assuming arguendothat it was appropriate to analyze the defendants'
claims under the traditional legal privileges, Master Gehan stated the test
correctly and applied it to the facts before him correctly. The research in
question spanned decades, and the industry obviously intended to put it to
multiple uses. In the leading corporate client attorney-client privilege
decision,120 the Supreme Court ofthe United States voiced the concern that
corporations might attempt to extend improperly the reach of the privilege
by "funneling" business communications through counsel.' 2 ' That concern
is hardly fanciful. In one survey of corporate counsel, the respondents
indicated that, upon occasion, business documents were "filtered" through
counsel "solely to protect the documents" by creating a privilege." Master
Gehan had sufficient facts before him to conclude that the Supreme Court's
concern had been realized in PhilipMorris. There were weighty motivations aside from litigation for conducting the scientific research, and his
holding was well-justified if not inevitable.'2
B. The Master'sDiscussionofthe TraditionalCrime-FraudException to
the Attorney-Client Privilege
In addition to finding that the defendants had not made a prima facie
case for privilege protection for the CTR research, Master Gehan determined the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications
between CTh officials and the defendants' attorneys concerning the

See Wellpoint Health Networks v. Superior Ct, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 850
(Ct App. 1997); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE ANDPRACTICE § 5.9, at464 (1995); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
An HistoricalPerspectiveon the Attorney-ClientPrivilege,66 CAL. L. REV. 1061,
1073 (1978). There were communications made by the CTR officials and attorneys
for the defendants in which CTR officials did seek legal advice. As to those
communications, Master Gehan held that the attorney-clientprivilege did not attach
because
of the crime-fraud exception. See infra text accompanying notes 124-36.
20
' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
'Id. at 395-96; see also Rice, supra note 17, at 27.
'" Alexander, supranote 111, at 344.
' Master Gehan also held that the plaintiffs had made the necessary showing
ofexceptional circumstances warranting access to the scientific research even if the
work product privilege was applicable to it. See Report of Special Master, supra
note 10, para. 287.
"9
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research. 24 He held that the privilege was prima facie applicable to these
communications despite the unprivileged nature of the research." z
However, the special master went on to hold that the plaintiffs had
established that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege applied to most
of the communications, thus making them discoverable. 6
A majority of American jurisdictions, including Minnesota,2 7 agree
that the crime-fraud exception exists.' Master Gehan broadly read the
leading Minnesota precedent, Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., to hold that the
exception applies even if the party seeking discovery cannot establish "all
elements of common law fraud."' 30 Unlike his finding that use in future
litigation was not the predominant purpose for the CTR research, Master
Gehan's interpretation of Levin is questionable.13' Citing federal authority,
the Levin opinion states that the "'[a]pplication of the crime-fraud
exception should not be based on a rigid analysis.' "132 However, that
language does not explicitly state that the underlying misconduct need not
constitute a full-fledged fraud. The federal court in the opinion cited by
Levin questioned whether the exception would apply absent "[a]n
indispensable element of [actionable] fraud."'' 3 On the other hand, the
language in Levin is expansive, and several jurisdictions subscribe to
"[b]roader formulations" of the exception which
"include more . . .
134
wrongdoing than crime and [technical] fraud."'

'

24

See id. paras. 288-310.

This holding isunremarkable. Clients frequently seek advice from attorneys
concerning the effect an unprivileged document may have on the client's legal
situation. The privilege applies to the advice and to all communications made for
the purpose
of obtaining and rendering the advice.
26
'

See Report of Special Master, supranote 10, paras. 328-30.

127 See ROGER C.PARK ETAL.,MINNEsOTA EvIDENTIARYFOUNDATIONs 145-46

(1996).
12 See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 6.4.10, at 279 (stating that the exception
"seems to be recognized everywhere").
29 Levin v.

C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), cited in
127, at 145 n. 11.

PARK ET AL., supra note
130 Report

of Special Master, supranote 10, para. 293.

Master Gehan candidly characterized his interpretation of Levin as his
"reading" of the opinion. Id.
'3'

132 Levin, 469 N.W.2d at 515 (citing Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski,
751 F.2d 277, 284 (8th Cir. 1984)).
113

Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 283 n.6 (8th Cir.

1984).
"i' WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 6.4.10, at 280; see also In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that the exception may encompass "crime,
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If Master Gehan's reading of Levin is accepted, it is difficult to fault
his treatment of the crime-fraud exception issue. In Philip Morris, the
essential deceit was suppressing unfavorable research findings while
continuing to represent to the public that objective scientific research
supported the industry belief that its product was safe.' 35 A rational
consumer could rely upon that representation in choosing to use the
defendants' products. Thus, the defendants' strategies appear to satisfy all
of the elements of common law fraud and deceit,'3 6 much less any
attenuated formulations of fraud.
I. THE DANGER OF RELYING ON THE TRADITIONAL
LEGAL PRIVILEGE CONCEPTS IN CASES INVOLVING
SCIENTIFIC PRODUCT SAFETY RESEARCH

Master Gehan's rulings on the work product and attorney-client
privileges and the crime-fraud privilege exception are obviously sustainable under traditional legal privilege principles. Nevertheless, the more
fundamental question is whether the PhilipMorris facts should have been
analyzed solely under those principles. Upon further scrutiny, it becomes
clear that there are grave dangers in placing exclusive reliance upon
traditional privilege principles in cases involving product safety research
similar to that found in PhilipMorris.
A.

The Inaptness ofRelying on the TraditionalWork Product and
Attorney-Client Concepts to Determine Whether a PrimaFacie
Casefor Applying PrivilegeProtectionHas Been Established

Traditional legal privileges work well enough in the typical products
liability case. In such a case, an accident occurs, and the defendant
thereafter submits the product involved to a forensic safety expert for
evaluation.' Typically, the manufacturer requests that an expert, who

fraud, or other type of misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the basic
premises of the adversary system").
13s See Rice, supra note 17, at 28.
136 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§§ 106-09 (5th ed. 1984).
137
See ROBERT HABUSH, ART OF ADvOCACY: CROSS EXAM OF NON-MEDICAL

EXPERTS § 4.05[l], at 4-25-27 (1981); J. E. Nichols & W. W. Allison, Where Is
Safety ExpertiseFound?, TRIAL, Nov. 1979, at 70; Harry M. Philo & Linda Miller
Atkinson, ProductsLiability: The Expert Witness, TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 37.
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specializes in preparing analyses to be used in litigation, 38 conduct an
analysis in the specific context of a pending or imminent lawsuit.'39 In this
situation, it is meaningfuil for the judge or special master to inquire whether
litigation was the primary motivation for the request. The decision maker
can focus on a limited time period and weigh the evidence indicating
whether, in that time frame, a litigation-use motive was paramount in the
mind of the business executives who requested the report. The issue is
straightforward: Did the defendant company's executive order the report
to prepare for trial, or was it ordered for a nonlegal, business reason such
as product improvement? The facts in Philip Morris do not meet the
criteria of the paradigm. The CTR research was not conducted over a short
period of time in connection with the prospect of a specific lawsuit.
Instead, the research dated back to 195414 and consisted of almost half a
century of scientific investigation into the general topic of the health risks
posed by cigarette smoking. Further, the CTR scientists were not forensic
4
experts specifically hiredto prepare a scientific analysis for use in a trial.' 1
Although forensic experts are asked to address the question of whether the
product is safe in its present condition, they are also expected to attempt to
answer such litigation-related issues as whether the product's safety could
have been improved prior to the accident and whether the product caused
the accident in question. These issues are oriented retrospectively.
In ongoing research into product safety issues, the type of expert and
the type of question addressed by that expert differ from the paradigm of
litigation research. The ongoing product safety researchers are staff or
consultant scientists rather than forensic specialists, and they are primarily
interested in the prospective question of whether the product can be made
safer in the future. Given the radical differences between the types of
experts and the types of questions put to them, the application of the
3 See 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC

§ 20-1, at 41 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (discussing the differences between
forensic
and
clinical toxicologists).
3 At
1'
least when the expert is asked to evaluate private information in the
possession of the manufacturer and submit the evaluation to the manufacturer's
attorney, many courts extend the attorney-client privilege to the expert's report
setting out the evaluation. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability ofthe
Attorney-ClientPrivilegetoNon-TestifingExperts:ReestablishingtheBoundaries
Between theAttorney-ClientPrivilegeandthe WorkProductProtection,68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 19, 21-22 (1990). Some courts have applied this view to engineers. See id.
at 22.
" See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 14.
141 See id.
EVIDENCE
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traditional legal privilege concepts to product safety research will almost
always lead to the result that there is no privilege protection. There is
obviously anonlegal "business" motivation forproduct safety research, and
that motivation will dictate that such research will not satisfy the requisite
purpose for either of the legal privileges.
The preceding analysis raises the policy question of whether there
should be any privilege protection for product safety research. We maintain
that the answer to the question should be in the affirmative. The current
state of the law-conferring privilege protection on forensic experts while
denying any protection to experts engaged in bona fide scientific product
safety research-is anomalous. Who is the more socially responsible
defendant: themanufacturerwho investigates itsproduct's safety only after
an accident and litigation, or the manufacturer who initiates a scientific
inquiry to improve the safety of its product before any accident occurs?
The latter manufacturer should be rewarded rather than penalized.
However, the current state of the law yields the Catch-22 outcome that the
law confers more privilege protection on the manufacturer whose conduct
is less socially responsible. Given the fact that the improvement of product
safety is an important social goal, the focus of the law of evidentiary
privileges should be the positive encouragement of ongoing systematic
scientific investigation into product safety.
Considered in that perspective, the facts in PhilipMorris indicate the
probability of an American tragedy. As Master Gehan's report states,
Helmet Wakeham was a senior Philip Morris researcher. 142 Inhis deposition in Philip Morris, Wakeham was asked about the "gentleman's
agreement" forbidding in-house biological research by the defendant
manufacturers.143 Wakeham conceded that years before the litigation, he
had expressed his opinion in writing that scientific expertise in the tobacco
industry could have produced beneficial research on smoking and health
but for the concern over forced disclosure of any negative findings of such
research. On this subject, he wrote, "Unfortunately ... the scientific
expertise of the industry, because of the liability suit situation, has not been
permitted to make a contribution to the problem, a contribution which I
believe was and is vital." 144
The defendants' staff researchers were in an unparalleled position to
make important contributions to the scientific investigation of the health
problems created by cigarette smoking. If normal competitive pressures

42

See id.para. 130.
See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 70.
'"Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para. 135.
1
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had dictated individual firms' research, it is quite conceivable that a safer
cigarette could have been produced. This development would have saved
tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars in health care expenditures. However, the manufacturers were so concerned about disclosure of
possible negative findings from such research in their administrative,
legislative, judicial, and public relations battles that they prohibited expert
researchers in individual firms from contributing to the investigation ofthe
health effects of smoking. Sober consideration of the loss of the possible
benefits of the prohibited research should force us to confront the issue of
the appropriate changes to make in the law of evidence to encourage such
research.
B. The DangerofApplying Master Gehan's Version of the Traditional
Crime-FraudExceptionto OverrideaPrimaFacieCaseforUpholding
a PrivilegeClaim
As we have seen, applying the purpose test for legal privileges in most
cases will leave scientific product safety research bereft of protection in
fact patterns such as Philip Morris. The disincentive to engage in such
research is marginally increased by Master Gehan's treatment of the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege in reaching the conclusion
that communications regarding the research between the CTR and the
defendants' lawyers receive no protection under the privilege.
Master Gehan embraced a broad version of the exception. A number
of the early common-law decisions on the exception suggest that its scope
is limited to egregious misconduct such as malum in se crimes and offenses
involving "moral turpitude. 1 45 Nonetheless, the trend has been to expand
the types of misconduct that bring the exception into play." Some
jurisdictions apply the exception to crimes and the tort of fraud, while
others have widened the scope to reach any crime or tort. 7 Master Gehan
went farther, ruling that the misconduct need not meet the requirements of
a technical fraud. 148 He opted for a balancing test: "Instead, the focus
should be on whether the detriment to justice from foreclosing inquiry into
pertinent facts is outweighed by the benefits to justice from a franker
145 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 95, at 352-53 (4th ed. 1992).

See, e.g., Fellerman v. Bradley, 493 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1985) (holding that the
exception extends to fraud, and in this context fraud should be interpreted
expansively).
47
" See WOLFRAM, supranote 8, § 6.4.10, at 280.
148 See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para. 293.
146
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disclosure in the lawyer's office."'49 His test is thus both broad and
50
vague.
The vagueness of Master Gehan's version ofthe crime-fraud exception
is troublesome. Under the prevailing instrumental rationale for privileges,
any exceptions must be stated in advance in clear terms. If a privilege is to
achieve the desired instrumental effect of encouraging conduct such as
client revelations to attorneys, the client must be able to make a reasonable
prediction as to whether the privilege will protect his or her revelation. 151
To make such a prediction, the attorney and client must be able to assess
both the likelihood that the privilege will attach and the probability that an
exception will apply. For that reason, the "contours"'5 of exceptions ought
to be defined in "bright line" terms. 3 Ambiguously worded exceptions
render the likelihood ofprivilege protection "unpredictable"'l- and thereby
"frustrate" the instrumental rationale for creating the privilege in the first
instance. 155 The instrumental theory views the client as a rational actor1 56
engaged in a cost/benefit analysis when the client decides whether to reveal
information to the client's attorney. The prospective benefit is the increased
value to the client of the attorney's services when the attorney is fully
informed by the client ofthe information the client considers sensitive. The
countervailing cost is the detriment the client will experience if the

149
Id.
50
1
Master Gehan's broad test for triggering the exception does not destroy the
availability of the privilege. Whatever the breadth of the test, the majority of courts
will not hold the exception applicable unless it is established that,at the time of the
communication, the client was seeking advice for the specific purpose of enabling
the client to commit the crime or tort in the future. See 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 95, at 350-51. Therefore, the exception applies only
if, at the time of their communication, the client solicited the attorney's services to
help the client perpetrate a crime or fraud, however defined. So long as there is a
firm requirement for a showing of that specific intent at the time of the
communication, the exception can be broadened to include other misconduct
without undermining the privilege.
5' SeeM. Brett Fulkerson, OneStep Forward,
Two StepsBack: The Recognized
but Undefined FederalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 62 Mo. L. REV. 401,
423-24 (1997).
152
Id. at 423.
"5 3 Id. at 422.
'4Id. at 423.
55
Id. at 424.
5

6See DANELM.HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERsON, ECONOMICANALYSIS
ANDMORALPHILOSOPHY 64 (1996) (discussing the concept of "homo rationalis").
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sensitive information is held to be unprivileged and a court compels its
disclosure. When the scope of a privilege exception is phrased in ambiguous terms, the client will find it very difficult to estimate this prospective
cost.
Our point is not that the indefiniteness of the scope of the exception, by
itself,will deter a manufacturer from undertaking systematic product safety
research. Because we are assuming that society wants to encourage
scientific analysis of product safety, the pertinent issue becomes whether
a vaguely worded exception tends to encourage or discourage such
research. Whatever other effects a vague exception might have, its natural
tendency will be to inhibit product safety research. The existence of an
ambiguously defined exception that may be invoked to compel disclosure
of a manufacturer's relevant communications with its attorneys will give
the manufacturer further reason to pause before undertaking various
research projects.
The net result is that it is hazardous for the socially responsible
manufacturer to begin scientific research into the safety of its product in
fact situations such as Philip Morris. The application of the purpose
requirement for the legal privileges will ordinarily lead to the conclusion
that there is not even a prima facie case for applying the privileges to
protect the research data. To make matters worse, even if the manufacturer
could persuade the judge or master that a prima facie case exists, the
existence of a vague crime-fraud exception will make the research project
a riskier proposition for the manufacturer. The upshot is that traditional
legal privilege concepts do not serve the public interest in encouraging
scientific product safety research. The question then arises: Are there other
evidence law concepts which can be used to serve that interest?
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PRIVILEGE ANALYSIS FOR CASES SUCH AS
PHILIPMORRIS INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT PRODUCT SAFETY RESEARCH
A. StatutoryPrivilegesShielding Self-CriticalEvaluationsandAnalyses
For decades, American evidence law has been affected by specific
statutes establishing privileges that shield reports of certain types of selfevaluations of operations or products conducted by firms and organizations. Probably the best known statutory privilege of this type is the
medical peer review evaluation privilege, which has been enacted in a
majority of states.'5 7 Modem hospitals routinely have such peer review

.57 See Leahy, supra note 56, at 55; see, e.g., Alexander v. Superior Court, 859
P.2d 96 (Cal. 1993); University of S. Cal. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260
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evaluation procedures in place. When a serious incident occurs at the
hospital, the medical staff investigates and evaluates the conduct of all
personnel involved, including the treating physicians and assigned nurses.
The privilege attaches to the report of this peer review investigation.
Without such a privilege, the hospital's exposure to a medical malpractice
suit might make the investigators hesitant either to conduct a thorough
investigation orto reduce their candid assessments to writing." 8 Proponents
of the privilege therefore argue that it serves to improve the quality of
patient care in the long term.'59
Another example is the privilege enacted in twenty states that shields
environmental audits by private businesses. 60 Although not yet the law in
a majority of states, there is a "strong trend toward state establishment of
[a] statutory environmental audit privilege."' 16 The purpose of such a
privilege is exemplified by the Colorado statute that begins with the
following legislative finding:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that protection of the
environment is enhanced by the public's voluntary compliance with
environmental laws and that the public will benefit from incentives to
identify and remedy environmental compliance issues. It is further
declared that limited expansion of the protection against disclosure will
encourage such voluntary compliance and improve environmental
62
quality.
The rationale for this privilege derives from the premise that environmental
quality will be enhanced ifbusinesses undertake serious internal investigations of their compliance practices. As with medical peer evaluations,
however, potential disclosure in tort suits might deter thorough investigation and candid analysis.
1. The Common Law Privilegefor Seif-CriticalAnalysis
Statutory self-evaluation privileges apply to specific types of selfanalytical reports, but a more general common law privilege concept, based
1996); People v. Superior Ct., 286 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App. 1991).
(Ct. App.
'58 See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249,250 (D.D.C. 1970), afl'd,
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
479 5F.2d
9
1 See id.

'"o See Joan M. Fildes, Statutory Privilegesand Immunities for Voluntarily
PerformedEnvironmentalAudits:Should New York StateJoin the Race?, 5 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J.257,258 (1998); Leahy, supra note 56, at 49 n.1.
161 Leahy, supra note 56, at 73.
162 COLO.REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(1) (1998).
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on the same rationale, has recently developed-the privilege for self-critical
analysis.163 The self-critical analysis privilege dates from the decision in
Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital,Inc.,"64 rendered in 1970. The Bredice court
held that the minutes of a hospital committee charged with conducting a
monthly review of the hospital's surgical operations could not be discovered
by a plaintiff alleging that an operation at the hospital had been performed
negligently.' 65 The court asserted that confidentiality was "essential to
effective functioning ofthese staffmeetings; andthese meetings are essential
to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients."'" The
jurisdiction had no statutory privileges that were applicable, and the court
announced that "the public interest" justified shielding the minutes from
discovery absent a showing of "good cause." 67
Although the doctrine originated in the medical peer review setting,
subsequent decisions have generalized the doctrine into a broader privilege
that is potentially applicable whenever a private entity undertakes a selfcritical analysis such as an evaluation of its compliance with the law 68 or an
assessment of the safety of its products or operations. 169 An often-cited
student note in the HarvardLawReview christened the doctrine as the "selfcritical analysis" privilege.170 Most commentators and courts continue to use
that phrase,'7 ' while a few prefer to call it the "self-evaluation" privilege.11

63
1

See John Louis Kellogg, Note, What's Goodfor the Goose... Differential
Treatment of the DeliberativeProcess and Self-CriticalAnalysis Privileges,52
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 255 (1997).
"6Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affid, 479
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
65
' See id. at 251.
166
Id. at 250.
'67Id.
at 251.
168 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court
indicated that other things being equal, it favored structuring the attorney-client
privilege to enable attorneys to more effectively encourage their clients to
voluntarily comply with the law. See id. at 392-93; see also DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 223 (1988).
169 See Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
170 Note, The Privilege of Self-CriticalAnalysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083
(1983).
171See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.48 [2] (3d ed.
1998); Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicabilityofthe Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilegeto
the Drug and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 93 (1997);
David P. Leonard, Codifying aPrivilegeforSelf-CriticalAnalysis, 25 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 113, 113 (1988).
"r23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 5431, at 457 (Supp. 1999); see
also, e.g.,Ronald J. Allen & CynthiaM. Hazelwood,Preservingthe Confidentiality
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The policy argument for recognizing this privilege is similar to the
rationale for the federal common law privilege shielding evidence of
deliberative processes leading to governmental decisions.' T3 The deliberative process privilege protects communications between executive
government officials in the process of reaching a decision on a government
issue. 174 The communication must be "predecisional"l inthe sense that the
officials are conducting an investigation and policy analysis with a view to
making a governmental decision.' 76 Furthermore, the privilege only
protects material which clearly reflects the decision-making process, such
as advisory opinions, recommendations, projections, proposals, and
deliberations.'" The premise oftheprivilege is that without protection from
disclosure, government policy makers would be reluctant to engage in
"uninhibited," "candid" discussions about policy issues, resulting in lower
quality governmental policy decisions. 178 The privilege is conditional or
qualified; the party seeking discovery can override it by establishing a
compelling need for the information. 179 The privilege has been sharply
criticized as inconsistent with the tradition of open government 8 and as
unnecessary because government officials often enjoy at least qualified
ofInternal CorporateInvestigations, 12 J. CoRP. L. 355, 357 (1987); Robert J.
Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation-The Corporate Self87 Nw.
orPragmaticPanacea,
EvaluativePrivilege:ParadigmaticPreferentialism
U. L. REv. 597, 597 (1993).
'"See Kellogg, supra note 163, at 271,280.
See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 5680.
'"New York City Managerial Employee Ass'n v. Dinkins, 807 F. Supp. 955,
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
176 See id.
" See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866
(D.C. Cir. 1980); K.L. v. Edgar, 964 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Russell
L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The DeliberativeProcessPrivilege, 54 Mo. L.
REv. 279, 297 (1989). The privilege extends to factual data only when that data is
inextricably intertwined with evaluations of the data and it is not feasible to
segregate the data from the evaluations. See Corporacion Insular de Seguros v.
Garcia, 709 F. Supp. 288,296 (D.P.R. 1989); Badhwarv. Department ofAir Force,
622 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (D.D.C. 1985), ordervacated, 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
"I26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 109, § 5680, at 131; see also Wilson
v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the need
for candor and uninhibited communication).
179SeeKL., 964 F. Supp. at 1208.
See 8WIGMORE, supranote 37, § 2378, at 797 n.7; 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 109, § 5663, at 573-74.
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immunity from civil liability.' 81Nevertheless, since its first articulation in
1958,82 the privilege has become a fixture in federal evidence law' and
has gained adherents among the state courts as well.8 4
The argument for the self-critical analysis privilege has an articulated
dimension that goes slightly beyond the justification for the deliberative
process privilege. Advocates for the self-critical analysis privilege argue
in the now familiar vein that the privilege is necessary to promote candor
between employees and consultants conducting the analysis." 5 Otherwise,
the participants as a group might fear that they were creating evidence
which could later be used to impose liability on the entity.'86 In addition,
advocates argue that individual participants might worry that any subsequent judgment resulting from the analysis would ruin their prospects for
advancement within the entity if their personal contribution to the selfcritical analysis furnished damaging evidence. 87
As a theoretical matter, the case for the self-critical analysis privilege
seems stronger than the case for the well-settled deliberative process
privilege. 188 Private sector businesses and their employees certainly have
greater reason to be concerned about the use of their analyses in subsequent
litigation because they do not have the absolute and qualified immunities
which public sector entities and employees often enjoy.I89 Nonetheless, the
status of the self-critical analysis privilege is less secure than that of the
deliberative process privilege. Some courts have rejected the concept of a
generally applicable self-critical analysis privilege, 190 and the privilege is

"' See Buchwaldv. UniversityN.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487,496 (10th Cir.
1998). Some commentators have dismissed the instrumental rationale for the
privilege as "puny." 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 109, § 5680, at 131.
'8 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
' See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 109, § 5680; Kellogg, supra note
163, 84at 256-57, 262-68, 280.
' See Wilson v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1996).
85
' See Kellogg, supra note 163, at 259.
18 6 See Andel, supranote 171, at 146.
117 See Gerald Heller, The ImportantbutMurkyLaw ofthe Sef-CriticalAnalysis
Privilege,
FED. LAW., May 1998, at 51.
88
' See Kellogg, supranote 163, at 278-79.
'19 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
90
See Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 331 (N.J. 1997)
("We decline to adopt the privilege of self-critical analysis as a full privilege, either
qualified or absolute[.]").
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recognized in only a minority ofjurisdictions.'91 On the other hand, a recent
federal circuit court opinion gave solid recognition to the privilege. 192
Therefore, the privilege seems to be a developing, though less than
thoroughly accepted, concept.
Using a well-known federal rule of evidence exclusion as an analogy,
the appropriateness of applying the self-critical analysis privilege to
programs of scientific product safety research becomes clear. If the product
safety research leads the organization to modify its product to improve its
safety, the modification would qualify as a subsequent remedial measure
for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 407.193 As pertinent, the
originally worded Rule 407 read:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event. 94
As the Advisory Committee explained, the foremost justification for Rule
407 is the social judgment which favors "encouraging people to take, or at
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety."'9 5 In the Committee's view, thatjudgment is the most "impressive"
rationale for Rule 407.11
The 1997 amendment to Rule 407 is pertinent here. After the Rules of
Evidence took effect in 1975, a split of authority developed over the
question ofwhether Rule 407 and its state counterparts bar the introduction
of evidence of subsequent repairs in defective product actions in which the
theory of strict liability applies.197 In such actions, some courts asserted that
19,
See

Kellogg, supra note 163, at 270 (stating that "most courts" reject the
privilege). In the view of one commentator, judicial enthusiasm for the privilege
is waning. See Andel, supra note 171, at 95-96, 117-20.
92
See Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423,425 n.1 (9th Cir.
1992); Leahy, supranote 56, at 53-54.
193 See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY

§§ 2.1-2.9 (1996).

,94 FED. P.EVID. 407 (West 1984) (amended 1997).
95
Id. advisory committee's note.
196
Id.

"9Compare Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719, 722 (8th Cir. 1992)
(introduction not barred), andAult v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148,
1150 (Cal. 1974) (introduction not barred), ith Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d
634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986) (introduction barred), and Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v.
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the manufacturer's tort exposure for a defective product is so great that
potential admissibility of the evidence of repair in a future case would not
deter a national manufacturer from making a needed repair.198 That
200
9
assertion has been attacked as speculative," and an "overwhelming"
2
0
"majority" ' of federal courts have concluded that it serves the policy of
Rule 407 to apply it to strict products liability actions. To settle the issue
once and for all, the Supreme Court promulgated an amendment to Rule
407 in 1997. As amended, Rule 407 provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are
taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a
product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.20 2
The new 1997 Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment
expressly approves of the decisions holding that the policy rationale of
Rule 407 extends to safety improvements in products liability actions.20 3
Considered together, the original and 1997 Advisory Committee Notes
endorse the view that there is an important "social policy of [affirmatively]
encouraging" manufacturers "to take... steps in furtherance of added
safety.

2 °4

Nevertheless, Rule 407 has been read by some courts to exclude only
evidence of the subsequent repair itself. It does not bar the admission of
evidence of studies conducted by a manufacturer to decide whether to
redesign its product for increased safety.20 5 On its face, the rule only bars
Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992)
barred).
(introduction
'98SeeAult, 528 P.2d at 1152.
19See J. Wesley Merritt, Comment, Ault v. International Harvester Co.-Death
Knell to the Exclusionary Rule Against Subsequent Remedial Conduct in Strict
ProductsLiability, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 208,222 (1975).
200 Gauthier,788 F.2d at 637.
201Prentiss& CarlisleCo., 972 F.2d at 10.
202
FED. .EVID. 407.
203 See id. advisory committee's note.
2 4FED.R. EVID. advisory committee's note on proposed rules.
25 The courts divide over this question. See Prentiss& Carlisle Co., 972 F.2d
at 10; In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon., 871 F.2d 812, 816 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Causey, 493 U.S. 917 (1989); Rocky
Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907, 918 (10th Cir.
1986); Martel v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 525 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Mass.
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the introduction of "evidence of the subsequent measure[ ]" itself.2" Thus,
the policy of "encouraging ... steps in furtherance of added safety" 07
supports a concept of exclusion or privilege significantly larger than that
stated in the text of the statutory exclusionary rule. If the final objective is
greater product safety, it can be reached most effectively by shielding any
reasonably necessary steps taken by the manufacturer to redesign the
product. The amended Rule 407 reflects a policy that justifies limits on the
admissibility of evidence of the subsequent repair. A fortiori,the policy
supports limits on the admissibility of evidence of reasonable preliminary
steps necessary to make a rational decision on making the repair. Viewed
in this light, a privilege for self-critical analysis becomes a natural
complement to Rule 407.
The extension of the privilege to scientific product safety research is
particularly justifiable. Society does not simply want product redesigns. As
the Advisory Committee Note emphasizes, society desires redesigns which
"add[ ]"to the "safety" of the product." 8 In many cases, it will not be selfevident whether a particular contemplated modification ofthe product will
increase, decrease, or have no effect on product safety. The procedure for
making that determination intelligently starts with a rigorous, systematic
scientific investigation of the question. If society wants improved product
safety, the law should facilitate and positively encourage the steps that
manufacturers must take in order to decide rationally on product safety
improvements. In the interest of public safety, the manufacturer should be
encouraged to resort to scientific research to verify the hypothesis before
modifying the product.
2. The Applicability andScope ofthe Self-CriticalAnalysis
Privilegein Cases Such as Philip Morris
A number of decisions have addressed the question of the foundation
or predicate facts that the party asserting the privilege must establish. The
court's description of the necessary foundation in Dowling v. American
Hawaii Cruises, Inc.2 represents the consensus view. There the court
specified that the party invoking the self-critical analysis privilege must
establish: (1) the document containing the analysis was prepared with an

1988).
206

FED.& EVID. 407.

207Id. advisory
20

committee's note.

od.
"0 Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
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expectation of confidentiality; (2) the confidentiality has since been
maintained; (3) the document was created as part ofa bona fide self-critical
analysis; (4) the public has a strong interest in fostering candor in the
analysis; and (5) the type of information is such that there is a realistic
danger that discovery of the information would curtail candor.210
A single but highly significant change in the facts of PhilipMorris
could have led a judge to find that these foundational requirements were
satisfied by the CTR research. From the early 1950s, the cigarette
manufacturers made a concerted effort to maintain the confidentiality of
any unfavorable scientific research into the health risks posed by smoking.
Additionally, the public interest certainly favored candor in the conduct of
this research; the potential for disclosure of negative results would certainly
curtail such candor. However, Master Gehan found that the CTR research
was tainted by a scheme to release simultaneously favorable research while
suppressing damaging findings. 211 Using the terms set out in Dowling,
Master Gehan could have found that the research was not part of a bona
fide self-critical analysis. Absent this finding, a judge or special master
using the self-critical analysis privilege concept would probably have held
that the privilege was prima facie applicable to the CTR research, and that
shielding the research would advance the "social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
212
furtherance of added safety."
It is also possible to make a strong argument that the defendants had
made a prima facie case for the application of the self-critical analysis
privilege in PhilipMorris on the facts before Master Gehan. As far as the
CTR scientists were concerned, they were engaged in a bona fide effort at
self-critical analysis; it is arguably the efforts and candor of the researchers
that should control on the question of beneficial intent.2 1 The fact that
higher management chose to use the research in a misleading manner
should not affect the prima facie application of the privilege, although, as
will be seen, the misleading use should ultimately override the prima facie
case and make the research discoverable.214
210

See id. at 425-26.
See Report of Special Master, supra note 10, para.283.
212
FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
213 Candor of researchers will produce meaningful analysis for improvements
in product safety. To promote researcher candor, the self-critical analysis privilege
should be applied readily to protect the freedom of researchers to be scientifically
accurate. If management chooses to act in a misleading manner with the research,
which
certainly was the case in PhilipMorris,the privilege will be lost.
214
See infra text accompanying notes 242-45.
21
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If the party asserting the privilege persuaded the judge that the
foundational facts had been shown, the scope of the application of the
privilege would become an important issue. On this point, the self-critical
analysis privilege is similar to the deliberative process doctrine. As
previously stated, the latter doctrine cloaks only communications considered integral to the deliberative process, such as recommendations,
proposals, and analyses. 215 Factual data typically falls outside the ambit of
the deliberative process privilege.2 16 In similar fashion, the case law
applying the self-critical analysis privilege usually protects only the
evaluative portions of the report documenting the analysis. The passages
reflecting the analyst's subjective impressions, opinions, and mental
processes qualify for protection, but factual data is routinely
discoverable.217
Examination of a hypothetical report of a scientific product safety
study illustrates the application of the analysis-fact distinction. The first
few pages of the report describe the product being evaluated. The
intermediate pages describe the research methodology and summarize the
data collected during the project. The final handful of pages detail the
findings of the analysis and the recommendations for enhancing the safety
of the product. At one extreme, it is clear that the first few pages are
discoverable. At the other extreme, the privilege would undeniably apply
to the last handful of pages. The discovery battle would be waged over the
pages in the middle of the report. The party seeking discovery would urge
the court to classify the raw research data as factual material. However, the
choice of the research methodology is evaluative, entailing the exercise of
the analyst's expertise.2 18 The party assertingthe privilege, therefore, would
have a strong argument that the raw data is so inextricably intertwined2 19
with the statement of the research methodology that all the intermediate
pages deserve privilege protection. A judge or special master would
certainly apply the privilege to the opening and concluding pages of the
report and would probably apply the privilege to the middle pages. The
215 See supra text

accompanying note 177.
177.
217 See Leahy, supra note 56, at 51, 55.
218 For example, if the analyst decided to use the statistical technique of
regression analysis in his or her research, the analyst would have to employ his or
her expertise in selecting the independent variables to include in the behavioral
model. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supranote 138, § 15-6(B), at 456-57.
219 See Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying the
deliberative process privilege).
216 See supra note
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final result would be that a substantial portion of the product safety
research study would receive privilege protection that it would not have
had under the traditional legal privileges.
B. An Alternative Analysisfor Overridinga PrimaFacieShowing of
the Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilege-The "InIssue'"Exception
As noted in the introduction, we believe that in PhilipMorris,Master
Gehan reached the right result for the wrong reason. Even when the selfcritical analysis privilege attaches to a particular document, the privilege
is merely conditional or qualified. n 0 This means that the party seeking
discovery can surmount the privilege by demonstrating an acute need for
the privileged material. In his report, Master Gehan made an alternative
ruling that the CTR research was not protected by the work product
privilege."' The work product privilege is also a conditional or qualified
privilege, and the Master found that the plaintiffs' need for the research'
outweighed the defendants' interest in maintaining confidentiality of their
findings.
Had the application of the self-critical analysis privilege been an issue
before Master Gehan, he would have had to perform a somewhat different
balancing test, one that requires weighing the plaintiffs' need for the
evidence against the long-term public interest in promoting scientific
product safety research. His resolution of the conditional work product
question suggests that he might have ruled similarly on a claim involving
the self-critical analysis privilege.
Regardless of how the balance would have been struck under the selfcritical analysis privilege, the inherent drawback to any judicial balancing

See Leahy, supranote 56, at 51, 55.
2'See Report of Special Master, supranote 10, para.282 ("I find thatplaintiffs
have demonstrated substantial need for documents concerning scientific research
that have been designated by defendants as fact work product, and that plaintiffs
are unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the withheld fact work product
without undue hardship.").
' When the relevant period of time is so lengthy-dating back to the 1950s-tort
law would permit the plaintiffs to establish the defendants' knowledge of the health
hazards posed by their product as a basis for arguing that the defendants' continued
marketing of the product entitled the plaintiffs to punitive damages. At several
points in his report, Master Gehan stressed that on the facts, the defendants'
knowledge was in issue. See id. paras. 268,288.
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of intangible factors and interests is constantm-it is impossible to quantify
the competing considerations. 4 Striking a balance when dealing with such
abstractions is a"procrustean task"'' due to the inherent imprecision in the
factors and interests involved. 6 Rather than rationalizing his alternative
denial ofworkproduct privilege protectionunderthe balancing test, Master
Gehan could have justified the discovery of the scientific research by
invoking the "in issue" privilege exception.227 This exception would also
have been applicable if Master Gehan's analysis had included the possible
application of the self-critical analysis privilege.
The in issue exception shouldnot be confused with the classic doctrine
of waiver, which is an "intentional relinquishment... of a known right." 8
Waiver would be established by evidence showing that a manufacturer,
knowing that a research document is privileged, intentionally discloses the
content of the document to a person outside the circle of confidence.
Without proof of intentional disclosure, waiver cannot be found. The in
issue exception does not require such disclosure, and it applies in certain
situations in which the waiver doctrine is inappropriate.
To illustrate the difference between waiver and the in issue exception,
assume that a manufacturer has two relevant, physically separate research
documents. The two documents describe different phases of the same
research project, and the researchers reached different conclusions in the
two phases. In the first phase document, the conclusion is favorable to the
manufacturer's position. In the second phase document, the conclusion is
unfavorable to the manufacturer. In pretrial discovery, the manufacturer
discloses the first phase document and attempts to assert a privilege to
suppress the second phase document. By intentional disclosure, the
manufacturer has clearly waived any privilege for the first phase document,
See United States v. Krenzelok, 874 F.2d 480,482 (7th Cir. 1989); Richard
B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 805 (1981).
2 See Lee E. Teitelbaum & Nancy Augustus Hertz, Evidence ff: Evidence of
Other Crimes as Proofoflntent,13 N.M. L. REV. 423,433 (1983).
' Comment, Evidence-OtherCrimes-BalancingRelevanceandNeedAgainst
UnfairPrejudiceto Determine the Admissibility of Other UnexplainedDeaths as
Proofofthe CorpusDelictiandthe Perpetrator'sIdentity,United States v. Woods,
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.1973), 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 173, 177 (1975).
226See Kuhns, supranote 223, at 808.
See Terrebonne, Ltd. of Cal. v. Murray, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (E.D. Cal.
1998); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 161 (Ct. App.
1994).
' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
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but, equally clearly, the manufacturer has not waived any of its privileges
with respect to the second phase document. Nonetheless, a court would
probably issue a discovery order holding that the manufacturer could not
invoke a privilege on the second phase document and therefore that the
document was discoverable. Under the assumed facts, the manufacturer's
simultaneous disclosure of one document and suppression of the other
would create a misleading half-truth. The basis for the discovery order for
the second phase document would be the patent "unfairness flowing from
... selective use of privileged material to garble the truth... [such that]
the opponent [should have] access to [the] related privileged material to set
the record straight. ' ' 9 In the assumed circumstances, partial disclosure is
distorting 0 and manipulative. 31 As one court put the matter, a "privilege
cannot be used as both a shield and a sword."132 The nexus between the two
documents is so strong that fairness demands that the party seeking
discovery have access to the second phase document after the privilege
holder has released the first phase document. 3
Just as the privilege for self-critical analysis rests on a rationale similar
to that underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 407, the in issue exception
shares a policy basis with Federal Rule of Evidence 106. This rule states:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
23 4
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
At first blush, Rule 106 appears to be a drastic provision.?35 Ordinarily,
each litigant has the right to choose which items of evidence he or she will
9 Richard

MICH.

L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator,84

L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1986).

See In re Southern & E. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 730 F. Supp. 582, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Report of Master of Chancery at 17-19, Heathman v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (Dist.Ct. BrazoriaCty. Tx. 1989) (No. 87-1934)).
2 See McLaughlinv. Lunde Truck Sales, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 916,918 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
2 United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1998).
2' See In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101-03 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F.
Supp. 1148, 1153-54 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
230

234 FED. R. EVID. 106.
235 See 1 EDwARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

§ 112, at 33 n.78 (3d ed. 1998).
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submit to the trier of fact. 6 However, Rule 106 empowers the crossexaminer to force the direct examiner to introduce evidence which the
direct examiner would prefer to omit. The Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 106 explains why the drafters chose to give the cross-examiner this
extraordinary right. The Note points out that when two documents are so
closely connected that they "ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously," 2 ' reading only one document to the jury creates a "misleading
impression... by taking matters out of context." '38
Fairness demands that the direct examiner read both documents or
neither one just as, in the facts assumed above, fairness demands that the
privilege-holding manufacturer reveal both documents in their entirety or
neither one at all. Under Rule 106 as well as the in issue exception, the aim
is to prevent the creation of a misleading impression through partial
disclosure. For that matter, the risk of creating a misleading impression is
greater in the privilege setting than in the Rule 106 context. Under Rule
106, if the direct examiner omits any mention of the equivalent of the
second phase document, the cross-examiner has the remedy of introducing
the document later?19 Concerning the subsequent introduction of the
omitted document, the Advisory Committee considered that alternative to
be partially ineffective, noting "the inadequacy of repair work when
delayed to a point later in the trial."'24 However, a partial remedy is better
than no remedy at all-which is the situation facing the victim of the partial
disclosure in the assumed fact situation-unless the trial court invokes the
in issue privilege exception.
The in issue privilege exception is well-tailored for the problem faced
by Master Gehan in Philip Morris. Indeed, it would have been poetic
justice had the exception been invoked. As pointed out above,2 4 the record
evidence convinced Master Gehan that in the early 1950s the tobacco
industry decided to pursue two contradictory strategies. The public strategy
featured the widespread announcements that the industry was researching
236

See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE

AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 3 (1988).
237 FED. R. EVID. 106.
2"

Id. advisory committee's note.

23 9InBeechAircraftCorp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.

153 (1988), the Supreme Court
stated that Rule 106 "partially codified" the common law completeness doctrine.
Id. at 155. Under the common law version of the doctrine, during cross
examination the opponent may introduce the second document so long as it is
relevant to the same topic. See 1 MCCORMICKONEvIDENCE, supranote 145, § 56.
240 FED.

24

K. EVID. 106 advisory committee's note.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-103.
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the alleged relationship between smoking and health problems,242 and the
available research data was either inconclusive or indicated that there was
no causal nexus.243 The private strategy was to place the manufacturer
defendants in a position where they could disclose favorable research
results while suppressing damaging findings.244 Citing an earlier finding by
the judge assigned to the PhilipMorris case, Master Gehan stated that the
defendants endeavored to "use [publicly] research which supports their
economic interests, but claim privilege for research which may not."245 The
in issue exception is the evidentiary antidote for the very type of misleading half-truth the defendants attempted to perpetrate. Therefore, even if
Master Gehan had applied the self-critical analysis privilege to the CTR
research, he could have reached the same final result and ordered disclosure by turning to the in issue exception. That exception would surmount
the prima facie case for the privilege.
CONCLUSION

Master Gehan's report in Philip Morris is noteworthy for several
reasons. The report sends an important legal ethics message to the litigation
bar that advocates must maintain an ethical awareness that applies to
prelitigation activities and to limitations imposed by adjectival law. In his
analysis of the crime-fraud exception, Master Gehan looked to the law of
evidence rather than the substantive law. In this analysis, he found a
species of evidentiary fraud in the defendants' attempts to "wrap" their
scientific research in bogus legal privilege claims.2' Significantly, he
inferred the fraud from strategic behavior247 of the defendants long before
the suit was filed. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct state that an attorney acts within "a larger legal
context shaping the lawyer's role.' 24 8 That context includes adjectival as
well as substantive law, and it covers an attorney's prelitigation conduct as

242 See Report

of Special Master, supra note 10, paras. 16, 17, 22.
See id. paras. 50, 55, 57, 58.
244 See id.paras. 283,
339.
24
- Id.para. 280.
246 Id. para. 42; see also
Rice, supra note 17, at 28; Zitrin & Langford, supra
note 17, at 46.
247 See generally AVINASH K. Dixrr & BARRY Y. NALEBUFF, THINKING
243

STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY

LIFE2 48(1991).

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

3 (Proposed Final Draft 198 1).
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well as conduct after suit is commenced. Master Gehan's report is a useful
reminder to litigators that they must bear the broader legal context in mind.
The PhilipMorris report is perhaps even more noteworthy for what it
does not say. Given the set of arguments submitted by counsel for both
sides, Master Gehan analyzed the discoverability of the defendant's
scientific research exclusively under traditional legal privilege concepts;
his report makes no mention of the self-critical analysis privilege. The
original and amended versions of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 establish
that there is a material public stake inpositively encouraging manufacturers
to conduct scientific product safety research. While the legal privileges
come into play when a manufacturer hires a forensic safety expert after the
fact of an accident, those privileges afford the manufacturer little or no
protection if the manufacturer is socially responsible enough to undertake
scientific analysis of the safety of its products without the stimulus of a
legal action.
As a matter of social policy, the law should encourage manufacturers
to make product safety improvements and to resort to serious scientific
investigation to identify possible improvements. Even if courts are
unwilling to recognize a general self-critical analysis privilege, scientific
product safety research is an ideal candidate for protection under a limited
conception of that privilege. Coupled with the in issue privilege exception,
the self-critical analysis privilege would enable the courts to give significant protection to bona fide research while policing abuses of the privilege.
Scientific product safety research can flourish only if researchers can
be candid in the research enterprise. We submit that courts must develop
new modes of analyzing evidentiary privilege claims along the lines of the
principles discussed above in order to encourage candor in product safety
research.

